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Abstract: This paper focuses on Newman’s approach to what we might call “the 
problem of the partiality and unity of the sciences.” The problem can be expressed 
in the form of a question: “If all human knowing is finite and partial, then on what 
grounds can one know of the unity and wholeness of all the sciences?” Newman’s 
solution to the problem is openly theistic, since it appeals to one’s knowledge 
of God. For Newman, even if I exclusively pursue my own partial science as a 
physicist, or psychologist, or historian, and even if I do not understand much 
about the content of the other sciences, nevertheless it is still possible for me to 
grasp the comprehensive ground of the unity of all the sciences, by virtue of my 
knowledge of God. The problem, however, is that this solution seems to rely on 
the sort of intellectual imperialism that Newman criticizes throughout much of 
his work. For this solution seems to assert the unity of the sciences only by placing 
one science— theology— above all the others as a supervening Uber-science. The 
aim of this paper is to defend Newman against this charge of imperialism, and to 
show that his thought is not only more plausible, but also more nuanced, than 
might appear at first sight.
Introduction
John Henry Newman was an elusive and controversial person during his life, and he remains so for us today. His extensive and multi-faceted corpus offers perspectives that will resonate with readers of just about any persua­sion: traditionalist, progressive, conservative, liberal, anti-modern, pro-modern, 
and even post-modern. One reason why Newman strikes us as such a multi-faceted 
figure is that he was indeed a very complex, subtle, and highly nuanced thinker. 
But another reason is that he was not a systematic thinker and had no aspirations 
about constructing a unified, comprehensive theory of metaphysics, epistemology, 
or ethics. Newman’s philosophical insights are scattered unevenly throughout his 
corpus, since he availed himself of philosophy in a more-or-less piecemeal and ad hoc
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fashion. In what follows, I shall not attempt to speculate about what a systematic 
representation of Newman’s philosophy might look like— or whether such a repre­
sentation is even possible. Instead, I shall focus on a particular philosophical issue 
that is present throughout Newman’s corpus, what might be called “the problem of 
the partiality and unity of the sciences.”
My investigation shall unfold in three main sections:
In section one, I discuss Newman’s understanding of the problem of the par­
tiality and the unity of the sciences with special reference to his famous work, The 
Idea o f  a University. Even though The Idea o f  a University does not explicitly address 
the philosophical dimensions of the problem, it does raise the problem in general 
terms and begins to address the problem’s social, cultural, and even intercultural 
dimensions. In section two, I introduce Newman’s theistic solution to the problem, 
and demonstrate how this solution can be theistic without being theological. In the 
third and final section, I show that Newman’s theistic solution is not only more 
plausible than may appear at first sight, but is also more interesting insofar as it is 
bound up with Newman’s attempt to reverse various aspects of our ordinary way 
of understanding things.
1. Newman on the Problem of the Partiality and Unity of the Sciences
As we enter into Newman’s thought on the problem of the partiality and unity 
of the sciences, it should be made clear at the outset that for Newman a “science” is 
not primarily a set of propositions or theories or doctrines. Rather, a science is an 
essentially human activity undertaken by finite, limited human minds for the purpose 
of making sense of the world and of the role of human beings within it. Contrary to 
modern “scientism,” Newman holds that what counts as the proper methodology or 
as valid evidence within any particular science cannot be determined by reference 
to any generalized or pre-established set of rules or guidelines. Each science has its 
own, immanently-generated set of standards and canons, and each science arrives at 
truths about the world and about human existence on the basis of its own delimiting 
assumptions, abstractions, and hypotheses. Because of this, each science is partial and 
abstractive, and delivers only partial, abstractive, and incomplete truths about the 
world as a whole.1 Seen in this context, the problem of the partiality of the sciences 
is in fact a specification of the more general philosophical problem of the partiality 
or abstractive character of all finite, human understanding whatsoever.
Newman himself discusses the problem by speaking of the need for a kind of 
“justice” or “diplomacy” among the various sciences, or among the various theoretical 
approaches to our understanding of the world. Thus he warns against the usurpa­
tions, encroachments, or transgressions that might occur when one science— in spite 
of its partiality— fails to recognize its own partiality and begins to tread upon the 
territory that properly belongs to another science. Even though he does not put it in 
precisely these terms, the philosophical problem for Newman is this: how does one 
science recognize and make sense of its own partiality, when it is itself partial, and 
thus when it does not possess a broader perspective or a “view of the whole” on the 
basis of which it can recognize and account for its own partiality? Or to approach the
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problem in slightly different terms: if each and every science provides only a partial, 
limited, and abstractive view of the world, then how can any finite, scientifically- 
informed mind really know that its own partial view really does fit harmoniously 
within an overarching whole, except by claiming to have a view of the whole and 
thus— implicitly and illicitly— by claiming to have escaped its own partiality? The 
philosophical issues broached by Newman’s questions are continuous with a host 
a problems in contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology;2 but within 
the context of the present paper, I will be able to address only a few dimensions of 
Newman’s approach to the problem.
In his Idea o f a University, Newman discusses the problem of the partiality 
and unity of the sciences in terms of what he calls the “rivalry” between the various 
sciences. Each of the sciences represents only a partial view of things, and in spite 
of their partiality, the sciences are the “natural rivals” of each other. i f  left to their 
own devices and without proper guidance, each of the sciences will tend to totalize 
itself and tend to usurp the rightful authority of some other science or sciences. 
For Newman:
[I]f you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep 
its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close 
up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude 
where they have no right.3
A proper integration of the various sciences is crucial, Newman argues, because 
the particular sciences—whether they acknowledge it or not—need one another, 
depend on one another, and complete one another.4 Because of this thoroughgoing 
interdependence, “to encroach upon any science . . . is to do an injury to all.”5
o n e  of the main goals of the university, then, is to ensure the proper integration 
of the various sciences, but— one must keep in mind— Newman does not regard 
such integration as a task to be achieved once and for all. The integration of the 
sciences is an ongoing task. This is so, not only because the sciences themselves are 
always expanding and developing; but also because the human tendency towards 
intellectual totalization and usurpation is itself not a passing affliction or a tempo­
rary condition. As long as human minds are finite and partial in their grasp, they 
will always tend to forget their own finitude and partiality. The tendency of finite 
human minds towards self-forgetfulness and intellectual usurpation or imperialism 
is not a tendency to be confronted, addressed, and overcome once and for all; it is a 
tendency that will be with us as long as we must pursue our intellectual endeavors 
with finite and partial human minds.
For Newman, indeed, the tendency towards totalization, or the forgetfulness 
of the partiality of one’s intellectual partiality, is part of a “natural dialectic” to 
which no finite human mind is immune. Accordingly, Newman’s Idea o f  a Univer­
sity might be understood as his Critique o f  Totalizing Reason. W hat Newman aims 
to provide us with is not so much a “magic pill” to be taken once and for all, but 
rather an exercise regimen to be followed on a regular basis. Newman’s university is 
never finally “achieved,” but is always in the process of being achieved. This is why
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Newman entitles his famous work in idealistic terms: it is the idea of a university, 
rather than the description of the university as actually achieved, or the plan for a 
university as actually achievable.
Now, when we put the problem in these terms, it becomes clear that, for 
Newman, the university represents nothing more than the imperfect, incomplete, 
institutional embodiment of an ideal philosophical view. According to this view, 
the individual sciences not only are part of a comprehensive, unified whole, but can 
be recognized as being part of a comprehensive, unified whole— even though one’s 
recognition of such wholeness is possible only from within the partial perspective 
of some individual science. in  other words, Newman’s university is the concrete, 
institutional embodiment of a philosophical ideal, namely the ideal of grasping the 
unity and wholeness of all possible knowledge, even from within the limited, finite, 
partial perspective of one’s own particular science or theoretical view.
The challenge of Newman’s ideal becomes all the more clear if we turn to his 
description of just what it is that the university is supposed to produce. For New­
man, the university should produce what he calls “the gentleman,” or— to use less 
politically incorrect language— it is supposed to produce liberally-educated persons, 
or persons possessed of “universal knowledge,” or what we might call “holistically- 
minded persons.” The holistically-minded person is not so described because he or 
she adheres to any particular view or set of doctrines. Nor is he or she so described 
because of the quantity of information that he or she has at his or her disposal. Rather, 
Newman’s “gentleman” or the holistic-minded person is one who has a particular 
intellectual habit, the habit of not being narrowed by the partial perspective of his 
or her own intellectual grasp of things.6
Such intellectual capaciousness and holistic-mindedness is not only good in 
itself insofar as it constitutes a perfection of the human mind as such. It is also good 
because of its social, cultural, and even intercultural ramifications. For Newman, 
a holistic-minded person is one who is not enslaved by the narrowing tendency of 
his or her particular intellectual endeavors. Throughout The Idea o f  a University, 
Newman makes abundantly clear that he is anxious and concerned that academics 
and intellectuals will be possessed by— rather than in be possession of—their in­
creasingly narrowed and specialized intellectual knowledge. The problem is not just 
that the sciences suffer; the more significant problem is that human beings become 
increasingly narrowed and even degraded. Newman warns:
[Y]ou must be above your knowledge, not under it, or it will oppress you; 
and the more you have of it, the greater will be the load. The learning of a 
Salamasius or a Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant.7
And in a passage that rivals even Nietzsche’s disdain for dead, useless, and dehuman­
izing knowledge, Newman observes:
[T]here are authors who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible in their 
literary resources. They measure knowledge by bulk, as it lies in the rude 
block, without symmetry, without design. . . . How many writers are there
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of Ecclesiastical History . . . who, breaking up their subjects into details, 
destroy its life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the 
parts! . . . Recollect, the Memory can tyrannize, as well as the Imagina­
tion. Derangement, i  believe, has been considered as a loss of control 
over a sequence of ideas. The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth 
deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the victim of a train 
of associations.8
Furthermore, for Newman, partial and fragmented knowledge may not only 
narrow and deaden the individual’s intellect and imagination; it can also separate 
and alienate the individual from his or her fellow human beings. Such alienation 
not only causes fragmentation and disintegration on a social level, but also leads 
to the dehumanization of the individual. In order to illustrate some of the dangers 
attendant upon an intellectual division of labor, Newman quotes from Dr. Edward 
Copleston, who had warned about the dangers of an economic division of labor. 
W ith the economic or intellectual division of labor, the human being:
becomes himself more and more degraded as a human being. in  pro­
portion as his sphere of action is narrowed his mental powers and his 
habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate part of some 
powerful machinery.9
in  addition to warning against the personal and social consequences of intellec­
tual partiality and fragmentation, Newman also makes clear that there are worrisome 
intercultural ramifications as well. For just as an individual can be narrowed by his 
or her own intellectual pursuits, and can become alienated from others within the 
same culture, so too he or she can become intellectually enslaved by the commitments 
that he or she happens to share with those in his or her own culture. By contrast, 
the liberally-educated, holistic-minded person will have an intellectual openness 
that makes possible greater intercultural understanding. In a statement that nicely 
anticipates the ideal of intercultural understanding announced in our own confer­
ence theme, Newman explains that a liberal education prepares a person:
to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It 
shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw him­
self into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to 
influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to 
bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground 
with every class.10
But now how— according to Newman— does the university student come to 
this habit of mind, when those who teach the different branches of knowledge within 
a university do so by focusing explicitly on one particular thing or another, and never 
on all of them together in their wholeness? The problem here is that there simply is 
no additional academic specialization or field of study that explicitly addresses the
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interconnectedness of all things and shows the student how one discipline— in all 
of its determinacy and detail— is related to all of its fellow disciplines. That is to say, 
there is no partial view that uniquely escapes the partiality of all partial views. And 
even though Newman valorizes “philosophy” or “the philosophical habit of m ind,” 
he does not mean to say that the unity of the different branches of knowledge is 
to be achieved through some particular philosophical view or set of doctrines that 
supervenes on the other sciences and holds them all together. Even for Newman, 
philosophy— insofar as it is itself a particular discipline— cannot explicitly play an 
over-riding, supervenient role within the university. And— as we can all imagine 
from our own professional experience— even if philosophers were given the task of 
overseeing the integration and unification of all branches of knowledge, it would 
not be long before they themselves would become divided over whether the inte­
gration should be Aristotelian, or Thomistic, or Cartesian, Leibnizian, Spinozistic, 
Hegelian, and so forth.
Newman is clear about the matter: the student arrives at a sense of the inter­
connectedness of all things, not from any additional university course and not from 
any Uber-discipline that would supervene on the others and draw them all together 
from some external, privileged point of view. Instead, Newman argues, the student 
arrives at a holistic point of view because of the way in which each of the individual 
disciplines is taught. Newman’s point is nicely illustrated in his discussion of profes­
sional training within a university context:
In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do 
not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine.
W hat indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something particular?
It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge, and in 
no other way. I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a 
Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, 
in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of 
being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving lectures which 
are the lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or 
political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he 
and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has 
taken survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very 
rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination 
and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession.11
For Newman, then, what distinguishes a university education from a non­
university education— even with respect to the training one gets in the professional 
fields— does not depend on the content of what is taught, but rather on the way in 
which it is taught. In a university, the specialized and potentially confining content 
of medicine, or law, or geology, or political science, or even history, or philosophy, 
or literature, is taught in a way that does not confine or contract, but rather in a 
way that positively expands the student’s openness to a pluralism of specializations
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and interdisciplinarity. W hat is distinctive about the university is that it addresses 
the problem of the partiality of the sciences, and does so through a kind of activity 
that permeates the manner in which any particular discipline is taught: this is the 
activity of ongoing dialogue or discussion (or good-spirited “rivalry”), which suc­
ceeds in systematically reminding all the participants that the different branches of 
knowledge are but abstractions and partial views, and outright falsifications if taken 
to represent the whole.
W hat is implicit here is Newman’s belief that individual university teachers 
must themselves be the kind of holistic-minded persons that the university aims to 
produce. More specifically, university education is not just about the production 
of holistically-minded persons, as if from out of a vacuum; more accurately, it is 
about the self-reproduction of holistically-minded persons. Furthermore, one simply 
cannot count on a teacher who is not a gentleman (in Newman’s sense) to produce 
another gentleman. If the teacher himself or herself is not also a holistically-minded 
person, then the students will not become holistically-minded— except perhaps per 
accidens: through a mistake or accident or luck. But accidents and luck are clearly 
not enough for Newman. The business of the university is the deliberate, reflective, 
and non-accidental self-reproduction of what he calls “gentlemen” or what we have 
called holistic-minded persons. And if this self-reproduction is to be deliberate and 
systematic, then one evidently needs some principle for asserting the unity and 
wholeness of all the partial sciences, in spite of their inescapable partiality.
2. Newman’s Theistic Solution to the Problem
We have now presented Newman’s view of the problem of the partiality and 
unity of sciences, but this presentation has only given rise to further questions. For 
example, how is it that the university can genuinely engage in the systematic and 
non-accidental production of “gentlemen,” when those who do the teaching are 
themselves partisan practitioners of different fields of study and thus naturally fall 
prey to the tendency to understand things according to the limited and limiting 
methods and hypotheses of their own disciplines? For Newman, we (as philosophers 
and educators) cannot simply ignore the problem, or hope that the integration of 
the different branches of knowledge will take place of its own accord. For as New­
man emphasizes, the human mind— in spite of its partial and limited grasp of 
things— naturally systematizes and naturally seeks completeness and unity in what 
it knows. The mind simply “cannot keep from speculating and systematizing.”12 
And in the absence of a carefully-articulated and critical principle of the unity of 
all the sciences, some false principle or some impostor will naturally arise to fill the 
vacuum. This is precisely what happens when some physicists propose to unify the 
sciences on the basis of a reductionistic causal determinism, or when some econo­
mists propose to unify them on the basis of an uncritical religion of efficiency, or 
utilitarianism. in  either case, a partial science has forgotten its own partiality and 
has taken itself to represent the essential truth of all the sciences. For Newman, one 
cannot simply propose a policy of benign non-interference among the different
118 Philosophy and Intercultural Understanding
disciplines. The human mind naturally aims to systematize, and so— if left with­
out proper guidance— it will naturally tend towards intellectual imperialism and 
interdisciplinary usurpation.
The university’s mission calls for active integration, and not just passive non­
interference, among the sciences. Furthermore, every university educator— regardless 
of his or her particular discipline— should in principle be committed to this goal of 
active integration. But how can any practitioner of a particular discipline go about 
trying to understand the unity and wholeness of the sciences, except on the basis 
of methodologies and premises that are specific to his or her own discipline? And if 
the unity of all the sciences is thus understood by each educator only on the basis of 
the terms set by his or her discipline, then isn’t any proposed “unity of the sciences” 
always going to be a false and partisan unity, understood only through the partial 
perspective of each discipline? In what follows, I will not be able to offer a compre­
hensive philosophical account of Newman’s solution to the problem of the partiality 
and unity of the sciences; however, I will be able to introduce Newman’s solution, 
and discuss some of the interesting philosophical ideas bound up with it.
O n the face of it, Newman’s solution to the problem is rather straightfor­
ward and simple. Newman’s solution is what we might label a “theistic” solution, 
since it is a solution that appeals to one’s knowledge of God. For Newman, even 
if I exclusively pursue my own partial science as a physicist, or psychologist, or 
historian, and even if I do not understand much about the content of the other 
sciences, nevertheless it is still possible for me to grasp the comprehensive ground 
of the unity of all the sciences, by virtue of my knowledge of God. For Newman, 
in other words, those who engage in very different intellectual pursuits can appreci­
ate the interconnectedness of all the sciences, not because they directly know this 
interconnectedness by knowing all the sciences, but rather because they know of 
the unitary source of all things that are investigated by the sciences, namely God. 
According to Newman’s theistic solution, “all branches of knowledge are connected 
together, because the subject matter of knowledge is intimately united in itself, as 
being the acts and the world of the Creator.”13 For Newman, it is our knowledge of 
God that allows us access to the ground of the non-partial unity of all the sciences 
and ultimately saves us from the intellectual narrowness or provincialism to which 
we are naturally prone.
Now, in addition to being initially plausible, Newman’s theistic solution also 
lends indirect support to his claims concerning the importance of theology and 
the Catholic faith in an ideal university. But on the other hand, Newman’s theis­
tic solution also gives rise to a host of new and important questions. First of all, 
doesn’t this solution— contrary to some of Newman’s other statements in the Idea 
o f a University— effectively elevate theology to the status of a totalizing Uber-science 
that would supervene externally on the other sciences in order to ensure their unity 
and interconnectedness? And doesn’t this elevation of theology to the status of a 
super-science effectively contravene Newman’s own warnings about one science 
usurping the domains of others? Furthermore, doesn’t this also fly in the face of 
Newman’s understanding that the student is to become holistically-educated, not
Newman on the Problem of the Partiality and Unity of the Sciences 119
on the basis of any content that is taught by any particular science, but on account 
of the holistic manner in which each and every one of the sciences is taught? And 
does this mean that Newman, in the final analysis, gives up on the ideal of “justice” 
and “diplomacy” among the sciences, and opts instead for a theological imperialism 
according to which one science must oversee and unify the others?
All of these critical questions might be well-placed if Newman’s claims concern­
ing our knowledge of God were “theological” in nature, rather than what i  have called 
“theistic.” Newman is indeed claiming that we can know of the ground of the unity 
of all the sciences on the basis of our knowledge of God; but— significantly— he is 
not claiming that our knowledge of God is primarily an intellectual or theoretical 
or scientific type of knowledge. Rather, Newman holds that we can know of God’s 
existence, and thus we can know of the comprehensive ground of the unity of all the 
sciences, on grounds that altogether transcend the limits of any particular science, 
including even the science of theology.
For Newman, our knowledge of the ground of the unity of all the sciences is 
itself not an achievement or a result of any particular science at all, and thus does not 
have to be partial in the way that all the sciences are. This is because, for Newman, 
we know of God most immediately and most adequately and most significantly on 
grounds that are wholly pre-scientific and pre-theoretical. Such knowledge of God is 
available to us on a moral basis, through the voice of “conscience.” In his Grammar 
o f Assent, Newman explains:
if, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at 
transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims 
upon us we fear.14
And in an unpublished paper on the same topic, Newman makes the same point, 
quoting from one of his own sermons:
Man has within his breast a certain commanding dictate, not a mere 
sentiment, not a mere opinion or impression or view of things, but a law, 
an authoritative voice, bidding him do certain things and avoid others.
I do not say that its particular injunctions are always clear, or that they 
are always consistent with each other; but what i  am insisting on here 
is this, that it commands; that it praises, blames, it threatens, it implies a 
future, and it witnesses of the unseen. it is more than a man’s own self.
The man himself has no power over it, or only with extreme difficulty; 
he did not make it, he cannot destroy it. . . . This is Conscience, and, 
from the nature of the case, its very existence carries on our minds to a 
Being exterior to ourselves; for else, whence did it come?15
For Newman, my awareness of the moral obligatoriness implied by the voice of 
conscience is as immediate, intimate, personal, and indubitable to me as my aware­
ness of my very own self. Newman explains that there is an intimate connection
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between my awareness of my own existence and my awareness of God’s existence 
through the voice of conscience:
[I]t is as improper to say I have faith in consciousness, sensation, memory, 
thought, reason as to say I have faith in my existence, . . . for reasoning is 
the very breath of my existence, for by it I know that I exist. . . . 
[Furthermore] when I say that the external fact of the existence of God is 
an object of faith, and a primary object, I do not mean that it is necessarily 
so in the order of history, but in the order of nature. I mean that it is more 
intimately connected with the nature of the human mind than anything 
else, and while it is to be received on faith, hardly it is so in fact. . . .
Though it is not easy to give a list of those primary conditions of the mind 
which are involved in the fact of existence, yet it is obvious to name some 
of them. I include among them, not only memory, sensation, reasoning, 
but also conscience.16
For Newman, just as I cannot coherently doubt my own mental acts or my own 
existence, so too I cannot coherently doubt the presence of the voice of conscience 
within me. The voice of conscience is just as indubitable as the presence of sensa­
tions or the presence of cogitations within me; and it is the presence of the voice 
of conscience within me (unlike the presence of mere sensations within me) that 
points immediately to the existence of God outside of me. O f course, Newman is 
not claiming that the voice of conscience is “indubitable” in the sense that it is always 
“correct” about what my moral obligations are. He is saying only that the voice of 
conscience is immediately certain and indubitable in the sense that my awareness of 
the being that I am— and I am inescapably a moral being— is immediately bound 
up with an awareness of moral obligatoriness, which is the voice of conscience.17 
And for Newman, this sense of moral obligatoriness implies the existence of God 
as moral obligator.
It is not possible here to give a full account or defense of Newman’s attempt to 
prove the existence of God on the basis of the voice of conscience. But Newman’s 
point concerning the indubitability of the voice of conscience can at least be illus­
trated through a brief thought experiment: given the kind of being I am, I cannot 
begin to doubt unless I am also committed to the view that I ought to doubt. How­
ever, I cannot be committed to the view that I ought to doubt without having some 
sense— no matter how inchoate or ill-formed— of moral obligatoriness. And if I have 
any sense of moral obligatoriness at all, then I must hear the voice of conscience. I 
might very well conclude that I ought to doubt the existence of a voice of conscience 
within me— or I might conclude that I ought not to doubt it. But regardless of how 
I happen to resolve this or any other particular ought-question, the crucial point is 
that I am able to entertain an ought-question in the first place. And if I can entertain 
any ought-question at all, then— for Newman— I understand what it means to be 
morally obligated, in which case I hear the voice of conscience.
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Now it is crucial to note here that, for Newman, the voice of conscience which 
forms the basis of our knowledge of God’s existence is entirely pre-linguistic, pre-theo­
retical, and pre-scientific. As a result, the voice of conscience in us is quite different 
from any theoretical or scientific expression of the voice of conscience; and our im­
mediate knowledge of God (which is bound up with the voice of conscience) is quite 
different from any theoretical or theological articulation of our knowledge of God. 
It is precisely for this reason that Newman can claim that this— our most intimate 
and direct knowledge of God— can legitimately ground our knowledge of the unity 
and wholeness of all the sciences. For our knowledge of God through conscience is 
not based on a partial theoretical view, and indeed is not based on any theoretical 
view at all. As a result, this knowledge of God uniquely escapes the partiality and 
one-sidedness that characterizes all theoretical views and all the sciences.
It follows, for Newman, that this conscience-based appeal to God as the 
ground of the unity and wholeness of all the sciences does not contravene his call 
for “justice” and “diplomacy” among the sciences, and does not involve any illicit, 
imperialistic stance whereby theology would supervene on the other, “lesser” sci­
ences. For Newman, we are saved from intellectual imperialism and usurpation, but 
not on account of any theoretical view of things. Rather, we are saved from such 
partiality and provincialism because of our morally, and not theoretically, grounded 
knowledge of God on the basis of conscience. For Newman, I can know that the 
various sciences, in spite of their partiality, are unified and whole. And I know this, 
not because I have access to any superior scientific or theoretical perspective that 
transcends the partiality of all the other sciences; rather, I know this because of my 
inescapable moral vision of the world, which gives me access to God on an altogether 
different and non-theoretical basis. My moral vision affords me a non-partial, non­
abstractive knowledge of God that no theory or science could claim for itself without 
running the risk of usurping other types and branches of knowledge. In short, we 
are saved from the usurpations of partial, abstractive, theoretical reason because of 
our knowledge of God which is available to us through immediate, concrete, and 
non-abstractive practical reason.
Given the limited scope of this paper, it will not be possible to discuss Newman’s 
nuanced thinking about the relation between theoretical and practical reason. Nor 
will it be possible to show in any detail how our morally-grounded knowledge of 
God’s existence can be appropriated by particular scientists and theorists so that they 
truly learn to regard their own sciences as but parts of a divinely-created whole. But 
at least a beginning has been made to show that Newman’s theistic solution to the 
problem of the partiality and unity of the sciences is not a theological solution; and 
as such, Newman’s solution does not itself contravene his own warnings against al­
lowing any one science to become an imperialistic, usurping force over the others.
3. Newman’s Three Reversals
In this third and final section, I would like to point out— however briefly— 
some of the ways in which Newman’s “theistic solution” is bound up with his attempt
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to reverse some of our ordinary ways of understanding things. In what follows, I 
shall discuss three of what I call Newman’s attempted reversals:
1) Newman reverses our ordinary understanding of the relation between our 
belief in God and our sense of moral obligation;
2) Newman reverses our ordinary understanding of the relation between our 
belief in God and our perception of the world; and
3) Newman reverses our ordinary understanding of the relation between the 
partiality of our knowledge and our situatedness in the physical world.
First of all, Newman reverses our ordinary understanding of the relation be­
tween our belief in God and our sense of moral obligation. As he puts it in response 
to a critic:
Ward thinks that I hold that moral obligation is, because there is a God.
But I hold just the reverse, viz. there is a God, because there is moral
obligation. I have a certain feeling in my mind, which I call conscience.
When I analyze this, I feel it involves the idea of a Father and a Judge,— of
one who sees my heart, etc.18
Newman’s reversal here makes his thinking on the matter quite similar to Immanuel 
Kant’s thinking. Indeed, Newman’s proof of the existence of God in many ways 
resembles the “moral proof” that Kant had offered.19 It is highly unlikely, however, 
that Newman was influenced by Kant’s more famous “moral proof,” since Newman 
read very little— if any— of Kant’s work.20 Furthermore, there is a crucial difference 
between Kant’s moral proof and Newman’s. While both proofs are based on our 
awareness of the moral law or moral obligation, Newman takes his proof to dem­
onstrate the actual existence of God, whereas Kant takes his proof to demonstrate 
only that we are justified in believing that God exists, even if no proof of God’s actual 
existence, or non-existence, is ever available to us.
Newman’s second reversal pertains to our understanding of the relation between 
our belief in God and how we perceive the world. According to some understand­
ings of the relation, we come to believe in God’s existence on the basis of what we 
perceive in the world (e.g., goodness, purposiveness, orderliness, causality, etc.). But 
Newman seeks to reverse this ordering, holding that I perceive the world as I do, 
because I believe in God, and not vice versa.
This partly explains why Newman was reluctant to rely on any empirically- 
based arguments for the existence of God.21 For to make belief in God’s existence 
depend on empirical claims is to make too much depend on merely partial, theoreti­
cal beliefs. Such empirically-grounded proofs of God’s existence do not make belief 
in God any more secure, but tend only to make people more narrow and dogmatic 
in their adherence to partial, empirical beliefs. Newman thus argues against the 
“design-proof” in a letter to W. R. Brownlow:
I have not insisted on the argument from design, because I am writing for
the 19 th century, by which, as represented by its philosophers, design is
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not admitted as proved. And to tell the truth, though I should not wish 
to preach on the subject, for 40 years I have been unable to see the logi­
cal force of the argument myself. I believe in design because I believe in 
God; not in a God because I see design.22
Newman’s resistance to empirical or theoretical arguments for God’s existence 
is bound up with his almost-Berkeleyan position on the status of the physical world. 
According to Newman, it may turn out that the physical world is nothing but a 
series of insubstantial shadows; however, for us humans, there is ultimately no need 
to distinguish between appearances and reality, provided only that we regard such 
appearances as given to us by God for ultimately moral purposes:
And should any one fear lest thoughts such as these should tend to a 
dreary and hopeless skepticism, let him take into account the Being and 
Providence of God, the Merciful and True; and he will at once be relieved 
of his anxiety. . . . W hat is it to us whether the knowledge He gives us 
be greater or less, if it be He who gives it? W hat is it to us whether it be 
exact or vague, if He bids us trust it? W hat have we to care whether we 
are or are not given to divide substance from shadow, if He is training 
us heavenwards by means of either? . . . If our senses supply the media 
by which we are put on trial, by which we are all brought together and 
hold intercourse with each other, and are disciplined and are taught, and 
enabled to benefit others, it is enough. . . . [W]e may leave the question 
of their substantial truth for another world.23
Indeed, Newman is even prepared to hold that space, time, and even matter 
are altogether unreal:
I must candidly confess that there are things, some of which [Ward] at 
least takes for granted as to be accepted on the report of the senses which 
I do not believe to exist, except the Church tells me, and then I believe 
them on her word, and believe the cogency of the argument on her word.
Ward says: “How do we know that men are here whom our senses bring 
before us and not in some other planet?” I answer, how do we know? I 
don’t know, perhaps they are. Nay, I believe they are. Again I don’t be­
lieve in the existence of space as a reality. It think it a sine qua non to our 
conceiving of matter— unless the Church determines otherwise— and 
then I hold it by faith in her word. I don’t believe in time. There is just 
one primary belief I have— not knowledge but belief— it is not in m at­
ter, or space, or time, or any of this sort of outward thing—yet it is an 
external and outward being, or I should not talk of faith— it is belief in 
the existence of God.24
This brings us to the topic of Newman’s third reversal, his reversal of the rela­
tion between the partiality of our scientific or theoretical knowledge (on the one
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hand), and our situatedness in the physical world (on the other). For Newman, the 
partiality of my scientific or theoretical knowledge is not fundamentally grounded 
on the fact that I happen to be situated in the physical world in a particular spatial 
and/or temporal location that prevents me from viewing the whole; nor is it funda­
mentally grounded on the fact that my scientific or theoretical knowledge depends 
on the givenness of matter or a material world outside of me. On Newman’s account, 
the partiality of my scientific or theoretical knowledge cannot be fundamentally a 
function of space, time, or even materiality, since Newman is clearly prepared to 
dispense with belief in space, time, and matter. For Newman, even if space, time, 
and matter might be unreal, it is nevertheless the case that my knowledge is partial 
and limited, and I know this because I know of my dependence on God through 
the voice of conscience.
For Newman, the partiality of my knowledge is bound up with the fact that 
my knowing is never fully transparent to itself, or— stated differently— the fact 
that the knowing of what I know (no matter how well I know that) is never fully 
identical with self-knowing. As Newman makes clear, it is one thing to know, and 
quite another thing to know one’s own knowing. There are
two processes, distinct from each other— the original process of reasoning, 
and next, the process of investigating our reasonings. All men reason, for 
to reason is nothing more than to gain truth from former truth, without 
the intervention of sense, to which brutes are limited; but all men do not 
reflect upon their own reasonings, much less reflect truly and accurately, 
so as to do justice to their own meaning. . . . In other words, all men 
have a reason, but not all men can give a reason.25
Furthermore, Newman holds, because the knowing of what one knows is never 
fully identical with self-knowing, it follows that there are “unconscious ideas” in us 
which make possible our conscious knowledge of things, but which remain essentially 
hidden from us and operative only “behind our backs,” so to speak:
[T]he impression made upon the mind [by an idea] need not even be 
recognized by the parties possessing it. It is no proof that persons are not 
possessed, because they are not conscious, of an idea. Nothing is of more 
frequent occurrence, whether in things sensible or intellectual, than the 
existence of such unperceived impressions. W hat do we mean when we 
say that certain persons do not know themselves, but that they are ruled 
by views, feelings, prejudices, objects which they do not recognize?26
For Newman, we fall into error, but not primarily because our limited spatial or 
temporal location prevents us from glimpsing a broader truth; rather, for New­
man, the primary cause of error is our tendency to understand ourselves in terms 
of conscious ideas only, all the while forgetting the unconscious ideas that make 
our conscious knowledge possible. We err, in other words, not so much because 
our acts of knowing do not accurately depict their own objects, but rather because
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we tend to understand our own partial acts of knowing as if they were not partial. 
And furthermore, the ground of this partiality has nothing to do with space, time, 
or matter, but rather with our reliance on unconscious ideas which we do not fully 
acknowledge. in  other words, the fundamental problem is not just in understand­
ing, but in sefmnderstanding. And this is the essence of Newman’s third reversal: 
it is not the case that my knowledge is partial because i  am fundamentally situated 
within a spatial, temporal, and material world; rather, I wrongly believe that space, 
time, and matter cause my knowledge to be partial, only because my knowledge is 
partial and lacks self-transparency in a much more primordial, self-forgetful way.
Because of the operation of unconscious ideas in us, Newman holds that it is 
sometimes possible for us to understand authors and writers better than they under­
stood themselves. In fact, Newman goes so far as to say that the living truth of an 
author’s idea is often not apparent in the author’s own expression of it, but becomes 
evident only later on, when the idea is discussed, applied, and even modified in the 
context of later issues and reflections. Newman writes:
[A]n idea not only modifies, but is modified, or at least influenced, by 
the state of things in which it is carried out, and is dependent in various 
ways on the circumstances which surround it. . . . i t  is indeed sometimes 
said that a stream is clearest near the spring. whatever use may fairly be 
made of this image, it does not apply to the history of a philosophy or 
belief, which on the contrary is more equable, and stronger when its bed 
has become deep, and broad, and full. . . . its beginnings are no measure 
of its capabilities or its scope. At first no one knows what it is, or what it is 
worth. It changes with [circumstances] in order to remain the same.27
W ith this paper, I hope that I have made a contribution towards illustrating some 
of the originality and relevance of Newman’s ideas, not only to help enhance our 
understanding of Newman on his own terms, but also to facilitate our own self­
understanding, too. As Newman himself suggests, the truth of his ideas can only 
be made manifest through the fruit that they might eventually bear in new contexts 
such as our own.
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